In the theory of psychological games it is assumed that players' preferences on material consequences depend on endogenous beliefs. Most of the applications of this theoretical framework assume that the psychological utility functions representing such preferences are common knowledge. But this is often unrealistic. In particular, it cannot be true in experimental games where players are subjects drawn at random from a population. Therefore an incomplete-information methodology is called for. We take a …rst step in this direction, focusing on models of guilt aversion in the Trust Game. We consider two alternative modeling assumptions: (i) guilt aversion depends on the role played in the game, because only the "trustee"can feel guilt for letting the co-player down, (ii) guilt aversion is independent of the role played in the game. We show how the set of Bayesian equilibria changes as the upper bound on guilt sensitivity varies, and we compare this with the complete-information case. Our analysis illustrates the incomplete-information approach to psychological games and can help organize experimental results in the Trust Game.
Introduction
The Trust Game is a stylized social dilemma whereby player A takes a costly action that generates a social return, and player B decides how to distribute the proceeds between himself and A. Experimental work on the Trust Game has shown systematic and signi…cant departures from the standard equilibrium prediction implied by the assumption of common knowledge of sel…sh preferences (see Berg et al. 1995 , Buskens & Raub 2008 , Section III.A of the survey by Cooper & Kagel 2013 , and the references therein). Given the simplicity of this game, such deviations are hard to explain as the result of bounded rationality. A recent paper by Charnessfrom the simple benchmark of sel…sh expected payo¤ maximization, the assumption that such preferences are common knowledge is farfetched. Therefore, it should be assumed that the game played in the lab is one with incomplete information, even though the rules of the game (who plays when, information about previous moves and material payo¤s at terminal nodes) are made common knowledge in experiments. This is consistent with the high heterogeneity of behavior and beliefs found in most experiments on other-regarding preferences (see Cooper & Kagel 2013 ). Our goal is to understand how such a game is played with incomplete information about guilt sensitivity.
We analyze two incomplete-information models of guilt aversion in the Trust Minigame, a binary-choice version of the Trust Game similar to the one analyzed by Charness & Dufwenberg (2006) . 2 In the simpler model it is common knowledge that player A, the "truster", is sel…sh and only player B, the "trustee", can feel guilt. In the more complex model guilt sensitivity is not role-dependent. The …rst model is more tractable and it may be appropriate in situations where the players come from di¤erent populations. The second model may be more appropriate for situations where the subjects playing in roles A and B are drawn from the same population, as in most experiments. However, even when players are drawn from the same population, it is not implausible to assume that sensitivity to guilt is triggered only when playing in role B. This assumption is consistent with insights from the evolutionary psychology of emotions (Haselton & Ketelaar 2006 ).
Our models do not assume that players know the objective statistical distribution of types and derive their beliefs from such distribution. If this were the case, di¤erent types could have di¤erent beliefs only if the types of A and B were correlated. But, under the random matching structure typical of lab experiments, the types of A and B are objectively independent with marginal probabilities given by the frequency distribution of types in the population from which subjects are drawn at random. Hence, conditioning on one's own type a player cannot learn anything about the type of the co-player. With this, in a Bayesian equilibrium a player's …rst and second-order beliefs about the co-player's would be type-independent, contrary to the …ndings of the above mentioned experimental literature which suggests instead that such beliefs are very heterogeneous. To allow for such heterogeneity, we analyze subjective Bayesian games, following the approach of Harsanyi's (1967-68) seminal work in its full generality. In particular, we distinguish between two components of a player's type, the utility type (here the sensitivity to guilt) and the epistemic type, which only determines beliefs. We adopt a simple and quite natural ordered parametrization of hierarchical beliefs with the following features. There are two possible guilt types of B, low and high. The epistemic type of A is parametrized by the subjective probability assigned by A to the high-guilt type of B; furthermore, A believes that the guilt component and the epistemic component of B's type are independent and all types of A agree about the epistemic type of B. In the second model, where both A and B can feel guilt, similar assumptions hold for the beliefs of B about the type of A. In the …rst model, where it is common knowledge that A is sel…sh, the epistemic type of B parametrizes B's belief about the probability assigned by A to the high-guilt type of B, the higher B's epistemic type, the higher (in a stochastic order sense) such belief. Thus, in the parlance of incomplete information models, the epistemic type of A is parametrized by the exogenous …rst-order beliefs of A, 3 and the same holds for B in the model with role-independent guilt aversion. On the other hand, the epistemic type of B is parametrized by his exogenous second-order beliefs in the model where A is known to be sel…sh.
With this, in the model with role-dependent guilt, we show that in Bayesian equilibria where a positive fraction of A-types trust player B, higher types choose more pro-social actions and hold more optimistic hierarchical beliefs about such actions. If the upper bound on guilt aversion is su¢ ciently high, there is only one equilibrium of this kind: Since the trusting action of (sel…sh) player A reveals A's hope that B will share, the high-guilt types of B choose this prosocial action independently of the epistemic component; thus the exogenous …rst-order belief of A about the guilt type of B coincides with the endogenous …rst-order belief about the prosocial choice of B. The maps from types to choices for both players are therefore determined by a kind a forwardinduction argument. When instead the upper bound on guilt aversion is low, the epistemic component of B's type matters and the propensity to share is higher for higher epistemic types. Furthermore, there may be multiple equilibria.
As explained above, the model with role-independent guilt is not a generalization of the previous one. In this case A's guilt sensitivity is not known and we assume that di¤erent epistemic types of B hold di¤erent beliefs about it, with higher types of B believing that A is more likely to be highly guilt averse. This yields a di¤erence with respect to the previous model: the endogenous second-order belief that player B holds, if trusted, about A's belief that B would share is decreasing in B's epistemic type, hence B's choice is less pro-social for higher epistemic types. This is not surprising because here the meaning of the order on B's epistemic types is di¤erent from the previous model. Intuitively, the more B believes that A is guilt averse, the less he interprets A's trusting choice as pursuing a high material payo¤, the less he is afraid that the sel…sh choice would disappoint A.
Related literature Our model …nds its intellectual home in the theory of psychological games, that is, the analysis of games with belief-dependent preferences (Geanakoplos et To our knowledge, this is one of the very few papers analyzing a psychological game with incomplete information, and the only one with a Bayesian equilibrium analysis of guilt aversion. Some papers analyze incomplete information models of games with belief-dependent preferences di¤erent from guilt aversion. Tadelis (2011) puts forward and validates experimentally a model of the Trust Minigame with incomplete information about player B's sensitivity to "shame". Caplin & Leahy (2004) analyze a model where a caring doctor has to decide whether to disclose health information to a patient with unknown propensity to anxiety. None of these models features heterogenous beliefs. Battigalli et al. (2012) analyze the cheap talk game of Gneezy's (2005) experiment under the assumption that the sender is a¤ected by an unknown sensitivity to guilt. They show that, under mild and reasonable assumptions about the heterogeneous second-order beliefs of subjects playing in the role of the sender, guilt aversion explains the central tendencies of Gneezy's data on deception. Interestingly, they are able to derive such results without relying on Bayesian equilibrium analysis. Finally, our paper is related to Attanasi et al. (2013) , who analyze experimentally the belief-dependent preferences, behavior and beliefs of subjects in the Trust Minigame. They show that making the elicited belief-dependent preferences common knowledge between the subjects of each matched pair signi…cantly a¤ects behavior and beliefs. This can be interpreted as comparison between a psychological game with incomplete information (control) and a psychological game with complete information (treatment). The theoretical comparison between treatment and control draws on the analysis of our paper, which therefore helps organizing the data of their experiment. More generally, we hope that our paper may have a pedagogical value for applied theorists and experimental economists who are interested in using psychological game theory to analyze social dilemmas.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the Trust Minigame with guilt aversion. Section 3 provides the methodology to analyze psychological Bayesian games, with a focus on the Trust Minigame with unknown guilt aversion. Section 4 puts forward and analyzes the model with role-dependent guilt, where A is known to be sel…sh. Section 5 puts forward and analyzes the model with role-independent guilt. Section 6 concludes. Formal proofs are collected in the Appendix.
Guilt aversion in the Trust Minigame
We analyze models of the Trust Minigame where players have di¤erent sensitivities to guilt feelings and incomplete information about the guilt sensitivity of the co-player. All the models we consider are based on the game form with material payo¤s depicted in Figure 1 . In the analysis of this game form, we denote players'strategies as follows:
In order to investigate the e¤ects of guilt feelings on behavior, we need to consider their …rst and second-order beliefs about strategies. We denote with i player i's …rst-order beliefs, and with i the second-order beliefs. 4 Speci…cally, we use the notation described in the following Note that we distinguish between the initial and conditional second-order beliefs of Bob, and we refer to the features of such beliefs that are relevant in our analysis. Indeed, we assume below that Bob's choice depends on his expectation of Ann's disappointment if he Keeps, which can be written as a function of the expected value of Ann's …rst-order belief. The second-order beliefs of Ann will be introduced later as needed.
According to the model of simple guilt (Battigalli & Dufwenberg, 2007) , player i su¤ers from guilt to the extent that he believes that he is letting the co-player i down. In particular, player i has belief-dependent preferences over material payo¤ distributions represented by the following psychological utility function
where m i is the material payo¤ of i, i 0 is his guilt sensitivity and maxf0; E i [m i ] m i g measures the extent of the co-player's disappointment given his subjective beliefs. We …rst assume that guilt sensitivity is role-dependent: only the second mover can be a¤ected by guilt ( A = 0, B 0), and this is common knowledge. Ignoring players' beliefs about parameters, the strategic situation can be represented with the following parametrized psychological game: Figure 2 . The Trust Minigame with psychological utilities Indeed, Ann can only be disappointed after terminal history (I; K), in which case the extent of her disappointment is
where m i (z) denotes the material payo¤ of i at terminal history z. Thus, the psychological utility of z = (I; K) for Bob (expressed as a function of Ann's …rst-order belief A ) is
Of course, when Bob evaluates his alternatives and chooses his optimal strategy, he compares the utility from choosing S with the expected psychological utility from choosing K, which depends on his second-order beliefs. As long as Bob initially assigns a strictly positive probability to I ( B = P B [I] > 0) the comparison between strategy S and K can equivalently be made either ex ante, or conditional on I, because the di¤erence between the ex ante expected utilities of S and K is proportional to the di¤erence between the conditional expected utilities of S and K:
By de…nition, 0 . The assumption that guilt sensitivity depends on one's role in a game is consistent with insights from the evolutionary psychology of emotions, which suggests that when a single emotion operates in a variety of di¤erent domains its e¤ects are moderated by contextual cues (Haselton & Ketelaar 2006) . Since this assumption simpli…es the analysis, we maintain it in the …rst part of the paper. In Section 5 we analyze a model where guilt sensitivity is role-independent.
In all the models considered below, for all parameter values, there is an equilibrium where Ann goes Out with probability one: If Ann is certain that Bob would Keep ( A = 0), she stays Out; if Bob's beliefs are correct, B = 0 and Bob's optimal strategy is indeed to Keep, exactly what Ann expects. 6 Yet, casual evidence and the experimental evidence cited in the Introduction show that positive fractions of agents systematically trust co-players and share with co-players. Therefore, when Out is not the unique equilibrium outcome of the model, we focus on the more interesting equilibria where trust and sharing occur with positive probability. We call such equilibria "nontrivial" because they are the equilibria where guilt aversion plays a role.
Methodology: Bayesian psychological games
We are going to model incomplete information about using the methodology …rst proposed by Harsanyi (1967-68) , suitably extended to psychological games (see also Battigalli & Dufwenberg 2009 , Section 6.2). We de…ne type structures that implicitly determine the possible hierarchies of subjective beliefs of the players.
Although our methodology is fully standard from the abstract theory perspective, it is not widely used in applied theory. Therefore, it is useful to describe carefully the building blocks of our approach.
A note on terminology We call "exogenous" a belief about an exogenous variable or a parameter: a belief about is an exogenous …rst-order belief, a joint belief about and exogenous …rst-order beliefs of the co-player is an exogenous second-order belief, and so on. We call "endogenous"a belief about a variable that we try to explain, or predict, with the strategic analysis of the game. In particular, a belief about strategies is an endogenous …rst-order belief, a joint belief about strategies and endogenous …rst-order beliefs is an endogenous second-order belief, and so on. We also call "endogenous" a joint belief about exogenous and endogenous variables. 7 Also, we distinguish between "player", which corresponds to the role (A or B) in the game, and the individual playing in role A or B, whom we call "agent". An agent is equivalently called "subject" when we refer to implementations of the game in laboratory experiments.
Type structures and hierarchies of beliefs
We consider situations where the psychological utility functions of players A and B are determined by parameters A 2 A , B 2 B known to A and B respectively, called the utility types of A and B. Formally, psychological utility is a parametrized function 8
where Z is the set of terminal histories of the game and H i (H i ) is a space of endogenous hierarchical beliefs of player i ( i). 9 Since in our applications i is the guilt sensitivity parameter of player i, we call i a guilt type. When the parameter set of player i, i , is a singleton, the guilt type of i is common knowledge. In models with role-dependent guilt sensitivity we have A 6 = B ; in particular, we assume that A is a singleton, because player A is commonly known to be a sel…sh expected material payo¤ maximizer, i.e. A = f0g. In models with roleindependent guilt sensitivity A = B = . In all our models we assume that B = f L ; H g with 0 = L < H . This simpli…es the parametrization of beliefs. 10 Our analysis can be extended to the case where i is an interval.
The subjective exogenous beliefs of A and B about each other private information and beliefs are implicitly represented by a type structure, that is, a tuple
Elements of T i are called Harsanyi types, or simply types. A Harsanyi type speci…es both the guilt type (more generally the utility type) and the exogenous beliefs of player i. The following are technical assumptions: for each player i, T i is a compact metric space, the set of Borel probability measures (T i ) is endowed with the topology of weak convergence (hence it is compact and metrizable), and the functions # i ( ), i ( ) are continuous. Also note that we use bold letters to 7 This terminology is appropriate because we are not trying to analyze stationary states of learning dynamics. If this instead were the case, we would use an appropriate version of the self-con…rming (or conjectural) equilibrium concept, and beliefs about would be part of what is to be explained,. i.e. they would be "endogenous" as well (see Esponda, 2012) . 8 Since i is just a preference parameter, it is appropriate to assume private values: the utility of i does not depend on denote functions interpreted as random variables, that is, functions that depend on the state of the world (t A ; t B ). Function # i ( ) speci…es the psychological utility (guilt sensitivity) of type t i , and function i ( ) determines the beliefs of t i about the utility and beliefs of the co-player i. In particular, the type structure yields, for each type of each player, an implicit description of hierarchical exogenous beliefs, as explained below. Given a random variable x i : T i ! X i , we denote events about x i either directly as subsets of T i , or according to the convention which is common in statistics. For example, both # 1 i ( H ) and # i = H denote the event that the guilt type of i is H . We use whatever notation is more convenient and transparent in the given context.
Once we append a type structure to the pro…le of parametrized utility functions, we obtain a Bayesian psychological game:
Epistemic types
We will consider type structures where the set of types T i can be factorized as T i = i T e i where T e i is a set T e i of epistemic types. The latter parametrize exogenous beliefs and we assume that the parameter space is T e i = [0; 1]. Therefore Harsanyi types are pairs given by a guilt type and an epistemic type:
. Furthermore, we assume that i ( i ; e i ) depends only on e i and is monotone: roughly, higher epistemic types of player i assign higher probability to high guilt and/or epistemic types of the co-player i. 11
Exogenous n-th order beliefs
The exogenous …rst-order belief of a type t i is determined by the equation
This way we obtain a map (# i ; p 1 i ) : T i ! i ( i ) for each i 2 fA; Bg. Then the exogenous second-order belief of a type t i is determined by the equation
Proceeding this way, we can associate a hierarchy of exogenous beliefs with each type. However, beliefs beyond the second-order will not be used in the analysis below.
Equilibrium
A Bayesian equilibrium of the psychological Trust Minigame with incomplete information is given by a pair of measurable decision functions ( A : T A ! fI; Og; B : T B ! fS; Kg) such that for each player i 2 fA; Bg and type t i 2 T i , choice i (t i ) maximizes i's expected psychological utility, given the endogenous beliefs of type t i about the co-player's choice and beliefs. 12 In a perfect Bayesian equilibrium, player B maximizes his conditional expected utility upon observing I, with conditional beliefs computed by Bayes rule, if possible. However, in the non-trivial equilibria we are going to focus on, action I is chosen by a positive fraction of A types, 1 1 If instead i also depended monotonically on i, we would have a form of perception of false consensus, that is, player i believes that higher guilt types of i are associated with higher beliefs about the guilt type of i. See Section 6 for a discussion of false consensus. 1 2 Such decision functions are often called "strategies". We avoid this terminology for two reasons. First, we are not studying a situation where player i decides how to play the game before being informed about his type; rather we study decisions of di¤erent agents playing in role i, where each agent is characterized by some type ti. Second, we want to avoid confusion with the strategies of the Trust Minigame, such as "Share if In".
hence it has positive probability. As we noticed in Section 2, in this case ex ante maximization of psychological utility is equivalent to conditional maximization; therefore non-trivial Bayesian equilibria are also perfect.
Endogenous n-th order beliefs and other random variables
It is important to understand how the type structure and decision functions i generate the endogenous beliefs of the players. We analyze psychological games where the utility of i (determined by his guilt type i ) depends on the strategy of i (identi…ed with i's plan) and on the …rst-order endogenous beliefs of i. For example, the utility of each guilt type B depends on B's material payo¤ determined by the sequence of actions and on the disappointment of A; the latter is positive if A plans to choose I, carries out such plan and then B replies with K, in this case A's disappointment is determined by the …rst-order belief of A about the choice of B, that is, the probability A assigned by A to strategy S.
The latter probability is an endogenous …rst-order belief determined by the type of A and the equilibrium decision function of B:
For player B (and the analyst), A : T i ! [0; 1] is a random variable. Player B can compute his initial expectation of A as follows: 13
Since B takes an action only if he observes I, his choice depends on his second-order belief conditional on I: 14
As the above equations illustrate, all the endogenous beliefs are implicitly determined by the equilibrium decision functions = ( A ; B ) (given the type structure). However, for the sake of clarity, in our analysis we will make the key endogenous beliefs explicit.
Beside …rst and second-order endogenous beliefs, the type structure and decision functions determine other random variables that will be used in our analysis (all written in bold). For example, the random variable "material payo¤ of player i" is 15
and the random variable "psychological utility of player i" is
where, of course, in the computation of E t i [m i ] type t i assigns probability one to the choice i (t i ). Furthermore, the epistemic type of player i is a random variable from the point of view of the co-player i. Formally, this random variable is just the projection from T A T B onto T e i : e i (t A ; t B ) = e i if and only if t i = ( i ; e i ) for some i 2 i . Thus, for example, [e i > x] denotes the event that the epistemic type of i is higher than x.
Actual distributions
In this paper we focus on the equilibrium derivation of the decision functions and of other endogenous random variables speci…ed above. Therefore, it is not necessary in our analysis to postulate an objective statistical distribution on the type space. 16 Of course, such a distribution is necessary to obtain statistical predictions from equilibrium analysis. We extensively comment on this in Section 6.
Role-dependent guilt
We start our analysis with a simple model where player A is commonly known to be sel…sh, i.e. a monetary payo¤ maximizer. For example, there may be an heterogeneous population of individuals from which players are drawn at random and assigned to roles A and B. The "potential"guilt sensitivity in this population can be either high,
But the actual guilt sensitivity is triggered by the role in the game: only player B can feel guilt.
Alternatively, we can imagine that it is commonly known that the individual playing in role A is drawn from a population of sel…sh agents, whereas the individual playing in role B is drawn from an heterogeneous population where some agents are guilt averse. Of course, this second interpretation does not …t well with standard experimental implementations of the Trust Minigame.
Complete Information model
Before we move on to the details of the incomplete information model, it is useful to report the results about the complete information benchmark (cf. Dufwenberg 2002) . The psychological game is described in Figure 2 of Section 2, assuming that B > 0 is commonly known. 17 As explained in Section 2, player B Shares (respectively Keeps) if his conditional secondorder belief satis…es 2 (and in particular with probability A = 1) it is optimal for A to go In. Moreover, if
it is optimal for B to Share when A goes In. This is also the unique forward induction equilibrium for B 2 (2; +1). Indeed, A …nds it optimal to go In if and only if A 1 2 . Therefore, if B rationalizes A's observed choice of going In, his conditional second-order belief satis…es
2 , which implies that it is (uniquely) optimal to Share, as
. In Appendix A.1 we provide a complete description of the equilibrium correspondence, including mixed equilibria.
A model with incomplete information and heterogeneous beliefs 4.2.1 Type structure
We have a continuum of types on both sides. The beliefs of player i about the type of the co-player i are determined by an epistemic parameter e i 2 [0; 1]. We assume for simplicity that each type of player A believes that the guilt and epistemic type of B are statistically independent. Since the guilt type of A is commonly known to be zero, for player A Harsanyi types and epistemic types coincide: T A = T e A = [0; 1] (in our more general formalism, T A = f0g T e A , which is isomorphic to T e A ). We let e A = t A 2 T A parametrize the subjective probability of the high-guilt type of B: Speci…cally, we let
and
for all t A ; e B ; x; y 2 [0; 1], B 2 f L ; H g. According to our general assumptions about type structures, the map e B 7 ! F e B ( ) is continuous. 18 Furthermore, we assume that the following stochastic order property holds: the conditional expectations E e B [t A jt A > x] are strictly increasing in e B , that is, 
Equilibrium analysis
As explained in Section 2, there is always an equilibrium outcome where all A-types stay Out. In this paper, we focus on the more interesting non-trivial equilibria where a positive fraction of A-types choose In. It turns out that all non-trivial equilibria exhibit threshold decision functions. Since beliefs are described by atomless distributions, the choice of the threshold type (who is indi¤erent) is immaterial for equilibrium analysis. We assume wlog that such type chooses the "low"action, that is, O for player A and K for player B. In what follows, we say that a decision function A is (weakly) increasing if there is a thresholdê A 2 (0; 1) (ê A 2 [0; 1]) such that 1 8 We assumed that B : TB ! (TA) is continuous. In the present model this means that eB ! eB implies that Fe B (tA) ! F e B (tA) for every continuity point of F e B . Since F e B is assumed to be continuous, Fe B ( ) must converge to F e B ( ) pointwise. 1 9 This assumption holds if the epistemic types of B are ordered by hazard rate. When every cdf Fe B is di¤eren-tiable, with fe B = F 0 e B , this can be expressed as follows: Proposition 1 In the model given by (4)- (5)- (6) 
hence A ( ) is strictly increasing and the incentive condition for A yieldŝ Sketch of proof First note that a low-guilt type of B always Keeps: B ( B ; e B ) = K if B < 1. This gives the necessary condition for existence of non-trivial equilibria. Furthermore, in a non-trivial equilibrium A's …rst-order endogenous belief A (t A ) = P t A [ B = S] is increasing in t A : B plays S only if his guilt type is high, therefore A (t A ) is the product of two probabilities, the probability that B's guilt type is high, P t A [# B = H ] = t A , and the probability P F [ B = Sj# B = H ] that B chooses S given that his guilt type is high. By eq. (4), the latter is determined by cdf F independently of t A :
2 0 On the other hand, when we speak of a real valued function ' : X ! R with X R (such as a cdf or a belief function), we say that ' is strictly increasing if x 0 > x 00 ) '(x 0 ) > '(x 00 ), and we just say that ' is increasing
We now need to analyze B's equilibrium decision function when the guilt type of B is high, that is, B (
H ; e B ). Since F e B has full support and a positive fraction of A-types chooses I, every epistemic type e B assigns a strictly positive probability to the event "A chooses I": 
which gives the formulas for 
High upper bound on guilt
H > 2 .
In the general case analyzed above, it is possible to have multiple non-trivial equilibria; it is also possible that non-trivial equilibria do not exist even if H > 1. We will show this in a parametric example (see Section 4.2.4). When instead B's upper bound on guilt sensitivity is su¢ ciently high ( H > 2), we can show that a non-trivial equilibrium exists, it is unique and has a simple form. Intuitively, this is due to the fact that with a high H we can apply a forward-induction argument: A chooses I i¤ A > 1 2 , thus I reveals A > 1 2 to player B, which implies that his conditional second-order belief is also higher than 
this implies that B chooses S if (and only if) his guilt type is high (# B = H ). It follows that, for player A, the probability of S coincides with the probability of the high-guilt type, and A chooses I i¤ this exogenous probability is higher than 1 2 . This completely determines the nontrivial equilibrium. This argument holds without assuming the stochastic order condition (6) . If this condition holds, then second-order endogenous beliefs are strictly increasing. With this, the formal proof of the following proposition is straightforward and hence we leave it to the reader.
Proposition 2 In the model given by (4)-(5), if
H > 2 there is a unique non-trivial Bayesian equilibrium ( A ; B ), and it has the following properties: 
A parametric example
We analyze a parametric representation of the exogenous beliefs of the players to illustrate our modeling approach with a speci…c example. The type structure is speci…ed as follows: all types of A have a uniform distribution on the epistemic types of B, and each epistemic type e B 2 (0; 1) has a mixture of two distributions on the types of A, the uniform on [0; 1] with weight " and the uniform on [e B ; 1] with weight (1 "): 21 Proposition 3 In the model given by (7)- (8) B (e B ) = 1 ê
, if 0 ê A < e B .
2 1 We also assume that eB = 0 has a uniform measure on [0; 1] and eB = 1 has a mixture of the uniform measure on [0; 1] and the Dirac measure concentrated on 1 with weights " and (1 "): But since each type of A has an atomless marginal belief on T e B = [0; 1], the beliefs of these extreme types of B are immaterial. 2 
Role-independent guilt
In Section 4 we analyzed a model in which player A is commonly known to be sel…sh, and only player B can feel guilt. We interpreted this model as the description of a population where the potential guilt sensitivity can be either high or low, whereas the actual guilt sensitivity is triggered by the role in the game. Now we assume instead that potential and actual guilt sensitivity coincide, because actual guilt sensitivity is role-independent. Each individual is a¤ected by simple guilt aversion with guilt sensitivity 2 . If an individual with guilt type is assigned to role i 2 fA; Bg then i = . Therefore in this model also player A may experience guilt feelings that are triggered by the expectation of B's disappointment. Player B can only be disappointed after the terminal history O, in which case the extent of his disappointment also depends on his strategy. More precisely, B's disappointment depends on his …rst-order belief on his own choice, i.e. on what B initially plans to do. Here we assume that B's plan coincides with his actual strategy.
To derive B's disappointment, …rst note that his expected material payo¤ is
Since m B (O) = 1 is the lowest material payo¤ for B,
We can represent this strategic situation with a psychological game parametrized by the guilt sensitivity parameters i (i = A; B) . To analyze such (more general) version of the Trust Minigame with guilt aversion we need to expand our notation about beliefs by introducing a feature of Ann's second-order beliefs that describes her expectation of Bob's disappointment if she goes Out:
The psychological game with role-independent guilt-aversion is more easily represented in a sort of reduced form where each player's psychological utility depends on his own endogenous second-order belief rather than the co-player's endogenous …rst-order belief, as shown in Figure  3 . 
Complete information model
We begin our analysis of the role-independent guilt model by considering its complete information benchmark, as we did for the role-dependent guilt case. We assume therefore that A > 0 and B > 0 are commonly known. As we stressed in Section 4.1, in a complete information equilibrium …rst and second-order beliefs are correct, and players maximize given their beliefs. In Appendix B.1 we provide a complete description of the equilibrium correspondence, including mixed equilibria.
Incomplete information model 5.2.1 Type structure
In the analysis of the game with role-independent guilt we maintain several assumptions that we made in Section 4.2.1. In particular, we still have a continuum of types on both sides, and each player i is characterized by a guilt type i 2 f L ; H g, with L = 0 < H , and an epistemic type e i , where the epistemic type determines the beliefs of player i about the type of the co-player. We assume for simplicity that each type of each player i believes that the guilt and epistemic types of the co-player i are independent. 23 Speci…cally, we let e i parametrize the subjective probability of the high-guilt type of the co-player: e i = P ( i ;e i ) # i = H . This implies that for
As a consequence, the second-order endogenous beliefs of players A and B are independent of their guilt sensitivity. We also assume that each type of each player has the same marginal beliefs about the epistemic type of the co-player given by a continuous cdf F with full support. Thus,
As in Section 4, higher epistemic types have higher beliefs about the type of the co-player. But unlike Section 4, all the types of player B have the same marginal beliefs about the epistemic type of player A. Here the epistemic type of B parametrizes a di¤erent feature of B's beliefs, i.e. the subjective probability that the guilt type of A is high. By eq. (9), i's expectation of e i is independent of e i , hence we write E e i [e i ] = E[e i ]. To simplify the exposition and avoid tedious discussions of subcases in the equilibrium analysis, we assume that this expectation is not too low:
Equilibrium analysis
Once again, as explained in Section 2, there is always a pooling equilibrium with no trust and no cooperation: all A-types go Out and all B-types Keep. Indeed, if player A is certain that B expects O and that, if surprised by I, he would Keep, O is the material-payo¤ maximizing choice and A feels no guilt in going Out because of the belief that B is not disappointed. In turn, B is certain that A expects him to Keep (and he may feel certain of this also after observing I with no violation of Bayes rule), hence he feels no guilt for keeping the money because he thinks he is not disappointing A.
Next we study the non-trivial equilibria. Recall that a non-trivial equilibrium is given by a pair of decision functions ( A ; B ), such that B is decreasing. The reason for the latter is that in this model (unlike the role-dependent guilt model) e B parametrizes the subjective probability that the guilt type of A is high. A high-guilt type of A is more willing to move In compared to a low-guilt type because this move does not disappoint B. Hence high-guilt types with intermediate …rst-order beliefs move In, while low-guilt types with the same beliefs stay Out. This implies that the more certain B is that A's guilt type is high, the more he thinks that A moves In to avoid guilt rather than to obtain a high material payo¤.
The fact that non-optimistic high-guilt types move In to avoid guilt also implies that a non-trivial equilibrium exists for a wide range of parameter values.
Proposition 4 In the model given by (9)- (10) (a) for every epistemic type e A ,
hence A ( ) is increasing, A ( ) is decreasing and the incentive conditions for A yield
(b) for every epistemic type e B ,
hence B ( ) is increasing, 
Sketch of proof First note that a low-guilt type of B always Keeps: B
L ; e B = K for every e B . This implies that in a non-trivial equilibrium the …rst-order endogenous belief of A, A (e A ), is increasing, as it was in the role-dependent guilt model. Eq. (9) implies that, for every player i, choice c and guilt type , the probability of i = c given # i = is determined by the marginal cdf F ; hence we write P F [ i = cj# i = ]. By eq. (9), the …rst-order belief of e A is A (e A ) = P F B = Sj# B = H e A .
With this, the decision function of the low-guilt type of A is increasing: A ( L ; e A ) = I if and
Moreover, the comparison between A's incentive condition when her guilt type is low, and A's incentive condition when her guilt type is high implies that if I is optimal for type ( L ; e A ) then it is also optimal for type ( H ; e A ). Therefore
This implies that B is increasing: the higher is the probability that B assigns to # A = H , the higher is B's belief that A chooses I, because A chooses I for a set of epistemic types that has a larger measure when the guilt type is high. Furthermore, I B and B ( H ; ) must be decreasing: as explained above the higher is e B , the more B interprets choice I with A's desire to avoid guilt rather than obtaining a high material payo¤ from B's Sharing. 
Therefore condition 1
. A more formal proof is contained in Appendix B.2.
Discussion
In this paper we analyzed Bayesian equilibrium models of the Trust Minigame with guilt aversion, assuming that each player is uncertain about the guilt sensitivity of the co-player (…rst-order uncertainty) and/or about the co-player's beliefs about his own guilt sensitivity (second-order uncertainty). The beliefs ascribed to players are determined by their Harsanyi types and are subjective. We analyzed two models: In the …rst one guilt is role-dependent, because only player B, the second mover (or trustee), can feel guilt. In this model A's type is purely epistemic and parametrizes his subjective probability that the guilt type of B is high. On the other hand, B's type has both a guilt and an epistemic component, where the latter parametrizes his second-order exogenous belief, i.e. his belief about A's belief about B's guilt type. In the second model guilt is role-independent, i.e. also the …rst mover A can feel guilt if he thinks that he is disappointing B by not trusting him. For the sake of simplicity and to keep symmetry between A and B also in modeling exogenous beliefs, in this second model we let the epistemic component of both players'types parametrize their …rst-order exogenous belief, i.e. their subjective probability that the co-player's guilt type is high. Therefore, the second model is not a generalization of the …rst one.
In the rest of this Section we …rst discuss the empirical implications of our models and then we o¤er our methodological perspective on the use of the subjective Bayesian equilibrium concept in games with belief dependent preferences.
Empirical predictions
An equilibrium speci…es actions, beliefs about actions (endogenous …rst-order beliefs) and beliefs about beliefs about actions (endogenous second-order beliefs) for each type of each player. We focused on non-trivial equilibria of the Trust Minigame where a positive fraction of A-types trust the second mover, B. Qualitative predictions about behavior and hierarchical beliefs about behavior can be obtained assuming that the actual distribution of types satis…es some mild assumptions. 25 Such predictions can be used to organize experimental data. If the distribution of types has a rich support and the upper bound on guilt aversion is su¢ ciently high, we should expect not only heterogeneous behavior, but also heterogeneous hierarchical beliefs about behavior, with a lot of subjects who exhibit intermediate beliefs. Furthermore, if the epistemic component of players' types is statistically independent of the guilt component, then we should observe positive correlation between pro-social actions and endogenous second-order beliefs (cf. Charness & Dufwenberg 2006). Indeed, the willingness to choose the pro-social action, in particular the willingness to Share of B, is an increasing function of the guilt type and of the endogenous (conditional) second-order belief. In our model, the latter depends only on the epistemic type. If epistemic and guilt types are statistically independent, then the pro-social action must be positively correlated with the endogenous second-order belief. 26 Statistical independence between the guilt and epistemic components of types is a natural benchmark. But it is also plausible to assume that, by a kind of false consensus e¤ect (see Ross et al. 1977) , types with higher guilt aversion tend to have higher beliefs about the aversion to guilt of the co-player. Adding such positive correlation to the model with role-independent guilt yields a negative correlation between the endogenous second-order beliefs of B-subjects and their guilt type: high-guilt types of B tend to believe that the guilt type of A is high and to explain A's trust as a desire to not disappoint B rather than to obtain a higher material payo¤. This tends to decrease the correlation between the pro-social action and (conditional) second-order beliefs. On the other hand, when A is known to be sel…sh (role-dependent guilt) we may have a di¤erent kind of false consensus: the higher the guilt type of B, the higher (in the stochastic sense) his belief about A's belief that B's guilt type is high. In this case positive correlation between the guilt and epistemic components tends to strengthen the positive correlation between the pro-social action and endogenous conditional second-order belief.
The actual existence of a false consensus e¤ect does not imply that players'subjective beliefs must display a perception of false consensus for the co-player. Such perceptions are modeled by the type structure. In our models there is no perception of false consensus because of the twin assumptions that the belief maps do not depend on the guilt component of players' type, and that each player deems the epistemic component of the co-player type to be independent of the guilt component. Taking into account what we just said about the actual false consensus e¤ect, we can speculate about the e¤ect of introducing the perception of false consensus in our models. If in the model with role-dependent guilt we let A perceive a positive correlation between the guilt and epistemic components of B's type, the qualitative results do not change: now A expects high-guilt types of B to be even more cooperative because he expects them to hold on average higher endogenous second-order beliefs. On the other hand, the e¤ects of introducing a strong perception of false consensus in the model with role-independent guilt are not clear: here higher guilt types of B should be expected to hold on average lower endogenous second-order beliefs.
Adequacy of subjective Bayesian equilibrium
Our use of Bayesian equilibrium analysis to model behavior and endogenous beliefs in games with belief-dependent preferences deserves discussion. It is sometimes argued that agents learn equilibrium behavior by playing a game many times against randomly matched co-players. However, our analysis cannot rely on such arguments for several reasons. First, in so far as we aim at organizing experimental data, we must take into account that in most experiments on the Trust Game subjects play the game one shot, hence they cannot learn. Second, as noted by Battigalli & Dufwenberg (2009) , once behavior has stabilized in a recurrent game, strategy distributions should look like a self-con…rming equilibrium, which is likely to be di¤erent from a Nash or Bayesian equilibrium if agents have belief-dependent preferences. A third, related issue is that we assume that players do not know the objective distribution of types. Then, even with standard preferences, subjective Bayesian equilibrium is not the right tool to capture selfcon…rming patterns of behavior. The reason is that Bayesian equilibrium postulates that players have correct conjectures about the true (type-dependent) decision functions of co-players. This assumption is justi…ed by learning in those (rare) circumstances when agents obtain su¢ cient information feedback to identify such decision functions.. However, such …ne information feedback should also allow to identify the distribution of types (cf. Dekel et al. 2004) .
We use Bayesian equilibrium analysis to provide an orderly and consistent description of strategic reasoning in an incomplete information environment. It has been shown that, if one drops the assumption that exogenous beliefs are derived from an objective distribution (as we do), then the Bayesian equilibrium assumption that players hold correct conjectures about the co-players' decision functions just ensures that behavior and endogenous beliefs are consistent with common certainty of rationality, which is characterized by incomplete-information rationalizability (Brandenburger & Dekel 1987 , Battigalli & Siniscalchi 2003 . Of course, our speci…c assumptions about exogenous beliefs yield equilibrium implications that go beyond mere rationalizability. Therefore we o¤er an analysis in between objective Bayesian-Nash equilibrium and the most general notion of incomplete-information rationalizability. It would be interesting to explore a rationalizability approach to the Trust Minigame with guilt aversion whereby some restrictions on beliefs are taken as given and commonly understood, as suggested by Battigalli & Siniscalchi (2003) for games with standard preferences. Battigalli et al. (2012) essentially is an example of this approach to the analysis of a cheap-talk sender-receiver game where the sender is a¤ected by guilt aversion.
Appendix
Appendix A. Analysis of role-dependent guilt
A.1: Equilibrium with complete information
We describe the mixed equilibrium correspondence of the Trust Minigame with guilt aversion when ( A ; B ) is common knowledge, A = 0 and B > 0. We rely on Nash's mass-action interpretation (cf. Weibull 1996) and think of a mixed strategy i 2 (S i ) as coming from a statistical distribution of pure strategies in a population of individuals playing in role i, under the assumption that individuals are drawn at random and matched to play the game. Thus i (s i ) is the fraction of individuals in population i playing s i , and also the objective probability that s i is played; but no individual actually randomizes. Thus, for example, if player A carries out his plan and O occurs, A cannot be disappointed because this means that the individual playing in role A planned to choose O with probability one. This interpretation is consistent with the incomplete information analysis to follow. The main di¤erence between the equilibria analyzed here and those of the incomplete information models is that here all the individuals playing in role i have the same beliefs about the co-player.
Given the special form of our psychological utility functions, we would obtain the same equilibria under the assumption that i (s i ) is the probability with which i plans to choose s i . Such equivalence holds trivially for standard games, but it does not hold for all psychological games.
An equilibrium is a pro…le ( A ; B ; A ; B ; ? B ; I B ) that satis…es the incentive conditions
and the belief conditions
Under the mass-action interpretation, the incentive conditions say that an action can be chosen by a positive fraction of individuals in population i only if it is a best reply to the common belief about i. The belief conditions state that beliefs of the …rst and second-order are correct. In particular, the overall initial second-order belief of B is a joint probability measure on the strategies and …rst-order beliefs of A, 
With this, the mixed equilibrium correspondence is as follows: 
A.2: Proof of Proposition 1
We start from the conjecture that the set ft A 2 [0; 1] : A (t A ) = Ig has a strictly positive measure and provide a characterization of the equilibria that verify this property. We go through a sequence of claims.
Claim 5
For every e B , B ( L ; e B ) = K, and B ( H ; e B ) = K whenever H
1.
Proof Fix e B arbitrarily. Recall that the optimal choice of type 
where B (e B )[ j A = I] is the conditional measure given by
Since B ( L ; e 0 B ) = K for every e 0 B 2 [0; 1], every type t A assigns at least probability 1 t A to K:
This implies ft A 2 [0; 1] : A (t A ) = 1g f1g.
Since cdf F e B is continuous, B (e B ) is an atomless probability measure, hence 28 We also provide a characterization of some properties of the endogenous beliefs of A and B. The following claim shows that A and A are increasing. We let A denote the probability measure on T e B = [0; 1] induced by cdf F . 29 Since the random 2 7 We could use our tie-breaking rule (the low action is chosen when indi¤erent) to conclude that B ( H ; eB) = K even if H B (eB) = 1, which yields the desired result. But we prefer the longer proof in the text to show that tie-breaking rules simplify the exposition, but are immaterial for our results. 2 8 Recall that we let I and S be the "high" actions of player A and B respectively. 2 9 That is, A ((x; y]) = F (y) F (x) for every x; y 2 T 
Claim 6
The beliefs and decision function of A satisfy the following conditions:
Proof Claim 5 and the incentive condition for B imply
The incentive condition for A ( A (t A ) = I i¤ (t A ) > 
where the inequality is strict becauseê A < 1, A (ê A ) = 
which is strictly increasing in e B , and
which is constant for e B ê A and strictly increasing for e B >ê A .
Proof. By (the analog of) Claim 6 (1 ")
(1 ")
(1 e B ) +"
(1 e B ) +" (1 ê A )
, if e B ê A 1,
if e B ê A 1,
"(e 2 B ê 2
which is constant for e B ê A and strictly increasing for e B >ê A . Now we show that in every non-trivial equilibrium, that is an equilibrium withê A < 1, every epistemic type of B who is indi¤erent between S and K (when # B = H ) is smaller thanê A . 
Claim 9 Ifê
In order to have a full analysis of the equilibria, we proceed by considering seven regions in the parameter space.
If B < 1 and A < 
B.2: Proof of Proposition 4
Again, we start from the conjecture that a strictly positive fraction of A-types choose I and provide a characterization of the equilibria that verify this property. We analyze the equilibrium decision functions A ( k ; ) : [0; 1] ! fI; Og, B ( k ; ) : [0; 1] ! fS; Kg, with k = H; L, and we show that they are monotone, with A ( k ; ) weakly increasing and B ( k ; ) weakly decreasing (letting I and S be the "high" actions of A and B respectively). We also provide a characterization of some properties of the endogenous beliefs. We do so by proceeding through a series of claims. Recall that A is the common marginal belief of each type of A about the epistemic type of B, and E HS B = e B : B ( H ; e B ) = S . The next claim shows that both A's initial …rst-order belief and her decision function are increasing in her epistemic type.
Claim 13
For every e A ,
Proof The analog of Claim 5 and B's incentive condition imply Proof Remember that B's disappointment depends on whether B plans to choose S or K after I. Therefore A's expectation of B's disappointment, A (e A ), depends on whether A expects B to choose S or K:
Decomposing expected values and taking into account that P B = Sj# B = L = 0 we obtain
.
for some e A . 
